Non-obvious Manipulability with Groups in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets

Louise Demoor, Mart\'i Jan\'e-Ballar\'in, Pierre Nunn, Subhajit Pramanik, Antoine Pr\'evotat and Makoto Yokoo

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Abstract: In Shapley-Scarf housing markets, Ma (1994) shows that top trading cycles (TTC) is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality (IR), Pareto efficiency (PE), and strategy-proofness. We ask what other mechanisms become possible when strategy-proofness is replaced by a weaker condition called non-obvious manipulability (NOM), introduced by Troyan and Morrill (2020). We first show that this weaker condition does not help on its own: every IR and PE mechanism is already NOM. We therefore introduce a new condition: NOM with groups, under which each agent knows the preferences of the other members of her group, but not those of agents outside the group. This condition reduces to strategy-proofness when all agents belong to one group, and to standard NOM when every group is a singleton. Also, we introduce a participation condition called group rationality (GR), which requires that no group do worse than it would by trading only among its own members. We then define a class of mechanisms called TTC with super-groups, whose members satisfy GR, PE, and NOM with groups. The class includes mechanisms that differ from standard TTC, including mechanisms that are not strategy-proof. Furthermore, we show that every mechanism that satisfies GR, PE, and NOM with groups has the same best- and worst-case outcomes as every TTC with super-groups mechanism.

Date: 2026-08
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