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The Long-Term Effects of British and French Colonization in Africa on Trust in Traditional Leaders

Brice Romuald Gueyap Kounga

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Trust in local institutions matters for trade, public goods provision, conflict resolution, and democratic consolidation. Using individual data from rounds 6 and 7 of the Afrobarometer surveys, I document that respondents in former British colonies are substantially more likely to trust traditional leaders than respondents in former French colonies. Cross-country comparisons of this kind are confounded by unobserved heterogeneity in pre- and post-colonial histories. To make progress on identification, I focus on Cameroon, which contains regions colonized by Britain and regions colonized by France within a single modern state, and I exploit the former colonial partition line as a geographic discontinuity, comparing respondents who live close to either side of the anglophone-francophone boundary. The theoretical argument is that the two colonial powers differed systematically in how they treated customary authority: British indirect rule preserved the governance functions of chiefs, while French direct rule subordinated chiefs to the administration and assigned them its most coercive tasks, taxation and forced labor above all, and these divergent experiences shaped the legitimacy of chieftaincy in ways that persist through institutional continuity and socialization. Consistent with this argument, respondents on the formerly British side are 22 to 26 percentage points more likely to trust traditional leaders than their neighbors on the formerly French side, and they are far more likely to have contacted a traditional leader in the previous year.

Date: 2026-08
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