Stable Matching with Peer-Dependent Preferences: Existence and Cutoff Characterization

Jacob D. Leshno

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper presents a framework for stable matching markets that accommodates the peer-dependent preferences employed in empirical work. We show the existence of a stable matching in a continuum economy and of an approximately stable matching in a large finite sampled economy under assumptions satisfied by standard empirical specifications. The analysis builds on a tractable characterization of stable matchings with peer-dependent preferences in terms of supply and demand equations along with a rational-expectations condition.

Date: 2026-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.18381 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2608.18381

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().