A Case for Competition in Information Provision

Bianca Sanesi and Federico Vaccari

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study how competition among biased news sources affects information and welfare when sources can misrepresent facts at a cost. Monopolistic and competitive market structures admit many equilibria. We develop a common belief-based selection criterion that applies to both and makes welfare comparisons possible. Under the refined outcomes, adding an oppositely biased source improves the receiver's welfare when that source faces sufficiently high misreporting costs. Competition disciplines the incumbent while introducing a few distortions of its own. Better information need not increase total welfare, and distorted advice from a monopolist can raise total welfare. Competition may improve decision-making without being socially beneficial.

Date: 2026-08
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