Contagious Ambiguity

Mira Frick, Ryota Iijima and Daisuke Oyama

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the strategic impact of ambiguity through the channel of higher-order beliefs. We show that even small amounts of prior ambiguity about game payoffs can generate arbitrarily large amounts of higher-order ambiguity. This gives rise to a novel form of contagion: vanishingly small payoff ambiguity can select ``secure'' actions (e.g., non-participation) as the unique equilibrium outcome even when those actions are almost dominated. We highlight two main implications. First, classical robustness results under probabilistic uncertainty break down under ambiguity when players can deviate to secure actions. Second, if a designer can introduce small amounts of payoff ambiguity into a game, this can serve as a powerful tool for unique implementation.

Date: 2026-08
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