Potentials and Weak Potentials in Acyclic and Weakly Acyclic Games

Igal Milchtaich

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a number of large, important families of finite games, not only is the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria nonempty but it is also reachable from any initial strategy profile by some sequence of myopic single-player moves to a better or best-reply strategy. This weak acyclicity property is weaker than acyclicity of the game, which requires every such sequence to reach an equilibrium. For example, all perfect-information extensive-form games are weakly acyclic, but they are generally not acyclic as even sequences of best-improvement steps may cycle. Weak acyclicity is equivalent to acyclicity of some priority rule, which is a rule that allows only some improvement moves. It is also equivalent to the existence of a weak potential, which unlike a potential increases along some rather than every sequence as above.

Date: 2026-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.25966 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2608.25966

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().