Strong Observable Substitutability and the Cumulative Offer Mechanism

Daisuke Hirata and Yusuke Kasuya

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the properties of the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) when institutions' choice functions satisfy strong observable substitutability (strong OS). First, we show that each of the following properties of the COM characterizes strong OS: IR monotonicity, weak Maskin monotonicity, and dropping monotonicity. Dropping monotonicity is a new condition weaker than weak Maskin monotonicity, and it is interpretable as a weakening of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness. Second, we show that when choice functions are strongly OS, weak group strategy-proofness of the COM reduces to individual strategy-proofness. However, strong OS is neither necessary nor "almost necessary" for this reduction.

Date: 2026-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
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