From the Social Choice Problem to a Collusion-Proof Tendering Mechanism for Dynamic Stochastic Projects

Endre Cs\'oka

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The VCG family and the AGV mechanism are two classical approaches to efficient implementation in the static social choice problem. In 2024, Cs\'oka et al. showed that AGV has critical weaknesses. In contrast, the transferable-utility Guaranteed Utility Mechanism (TU-GUM) retains all the standard desirable properties of AGV while adding further ones, including collusion-proofness, because it implements efficiency in Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium. TU-GUM also applies to a more general dynamic setting with multiple extensions. Moreover, TU-GUM is a special case of an even more general and robust mechanism that combines contingent first-price tendering with the coordinated execution of dynamic stochastic multi-agent projects through a surprisingly simple rule. This paper summarizes and connects existing results from a different perspective, with some minor new observations.

Date: 2026-08
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