Communicating About Endogenous Issues

Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Limited attention forces organizations to decide not only how much to discuss, but also which issues merit discussion. We study strategic communication about a multidimensional decision when a receiver can respond only along a few endogenously chosen issues. Players agree on the ideal action but prioritize different errors. In equilibrium, communicated and omitted issues must be statistically unrelated and separable according to the sender's preferences. Thus, the sender's priorities determine the agenda; the receiver's do not. Synchronized priorities raise the receiver's best equilibrium payoff but lower his worst, so he may prefer a less synchronized sender.

Date: 2026-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.00380 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2609.00380

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().