Strategic Centrality and the Emergence of Core-Periphery Networks

Itai Arieli, Jo\~ao Correia-da-Silva, Wade Hann-Caruthers and Anna Rubinchik

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Abstract: We study a network formation game in which agents sponsor links at a linear cost in order to maximize centrality, defined as a weighted sum of walk counts with positive and weakly decreasing weights. This class includes Katz Bonacich centrality and total communicability and captures environments in which access decays with distance. Our main result is a sharp equilibrium characterization: every Nash equilibrium network is core periphery, meaning there exists a set $C$ such that every node is linked to every node in $C$, and there are no other edges. The driving force is that linking to better connected agents generates many additional short connections at once, so incentives concentrate links on a dense subset. Finally, we show that the welfare maximizing network is always either empty or complete.

Date: 2026-09
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