Sequential Pricing Mechanisms for Surplus Division

Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, Matias Nunez and Giacomo Rostagno

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Extending the Price-and-Choose (P&C) mechanism of Echenique and Nunez (2025), we propose the Price-Accept-and-Choose (PA&C) mechanism, which preserves efficiency while eliminating P&C's first-mover advantage. We then analyze randomized and bidding variants and show that the resulting equilibrium payoffs correspond to standard solutions in transferable utility games: the Center of the Imputation Set value for P&C and the Shapley value for PA&C. In the randomized variants, these solutions arise in expectation; in the bidding variants, they are implemented on every equilibrium path. We further relate other efficient designs, such as balanced VCG payments, to additional solution concepts, forging an interpretable bridge between implementation theory and cooperative game theory.

Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.02773 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2609.02773

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().