Mechanism Design for Ad-Supported Platforms

Shota Ichihashi, Doh-Shin Jeon and Byung-Cheol Kim

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Many digital platforms earn revenue by selling content access and displaying ads. We study monopoly screening by a platform allocating heterogeneous content and ads to heterogeneous consumers. Advertising generates revenue and affects information rents through nuisance, which alters the platform's incentives to allocate content. The optimal mechanism balances a trade-off between advertising and rent extraction: Expanding content access increases advertising revenue but reduces sales revenue by raising information rents. The mechanism features novel distortions in content access and ad exposure, rationalizes contracts across ad-supported platforms, and explains why greater ad profitability may weaken incentives to invest in content quality.

Date: 2026-09
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