Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games with Planned Actions and Scouting

Wolfgang Kuhle

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study coordination games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information about their adversary's preparations. Precise information enables agents to screen for cooperation, selecting the payoff-dominant equilibrium either via small exogenous trembles or via payoff uncertainty. Across scenarios, we emphasize that decomposing an action into (i) preparation and (ii) execution allows us to analyze simultaneous-move games where players partially observe each other's contemporaneous actions.

Date: 2026-09
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