Putting Context into Preference Aggregation

Philipp Peitler and Karl H. Schlag

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The axioms underlying Arrow's impossibility theorem are very restrictive in terms of what can be used when aggregating preferences. Social preferences may not depend on the menu nor on preferences over alternatives outside the menu. But context matters. So, we weaken these restrictions to allow for context to be included. The context, as we define, describes which alternatives in the menu and which preferences over alternatives outside the menu matter. We obtain unique representations. These are discussed in examples involving markets, the intertemporal well-being of an individual, and bargaining.

Date: 2026-09
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