Wherefore BIC = DIC?

Mark Whitmeyer

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I show that the equivalence in finite social-choice environments of Bayesian incentive compatibility and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility holds universally if and only if every type-dependent difference in the valuation of prizes operates through a single scalar type index. Beyond binary domains this universal robustifiability is nongeneric.

Date: 2026-09
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