Evolution of Market Microstructure in the Age of AI

Irene Aldridge

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Market microstructure studies how trading rules turn orders into prices and allocations. Those rules have been rebuilt repeatedly: for floor traders, electronic limit order books and high-frequency trading, batch auctions and dark pools, blockchains run by automated market makers and block builders, and now AI agents that discover, pay for, and compete over resources. This survey traces that evolution through one question: can a market allocate scarce goods efficiently and fairly without participants revealing everything they know and want? Each technological shift moved the binding constraint of market design from trader rationality to speed, to control over transaction ordering, to the dimensionality of what participants can report. Impossibility results persist; only their cost moves. We review evidence on high-frequency trading, trading venues, automated market makers, extractable value and algorithmic collusion, and identify allocation as the missing layer of the agent-commerce protocol stack.

Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mst
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