The Accommodation Trap: Survival Dependence, Communication, and the Allocation of Invisible Work

Samiha Tariq

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of accommodation traps in workplace hierarchies. Workers with weak outside options face a higher relational cost of appearing unavailable, resistant, or difficult, and so adopt accommodative communication (extra deference, softened boundaries, visible flexibility) to preserve the employment relationship. This short-run strategy is also an informative signal: a friction-minimizing supervisor rationally infers that an accommodating worker is less likely to resist, and assigns that worker the invisible, low-promotability work. The signal harms the worker who sends it. Unlike agents in ratchet-effect models, who conceal information that would invite heavier demands, dependent workers reveal their low refusal cost, because the relational value of accommodating rises with dependence. The resulting inequality requires no productivity difference and no taste for discrimination, and the supervisor's beliefs are correct, so correcting beliefs cannot remove it. When visible work builds outside options and invisible work erodes them, the allocation becomes self-reinforcing, and even workers who start out identical are locked into unequal roles with probability one. The equilibrium is privately rational for every party yet socially inefficient whenever diminishing returns to outside options outweigh the supervisor's friction cost. Attaching recognition to invisible work, rotating it by rule, or limiting managerial discretion each weakens or breaks the link from communication to assignment that sustains the trap.

Date: 2026-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.33064 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2609.33064

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().