A Topological Condition for Aggregation on Weak Preference Domains

Sizhong Fang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper provides a topological construction for studying social aggregation of weak preferences over a finite set of alternatives. We identify weak preferences with the cells of the type $A_{n-1}$ braid arrangement and, equivalently, with the simplices of the corresponding type $A_{n-1}$ Coxeter complex, which we call the preference complex. Then we define face-monotonicity by requiring a social welfare function to be order-preserving when viewed as a map between the preference-profile poset and the preference poset. We prove that if a common preference domain admits a unanimous, anonymous, and face-monotonic social welfare function, then every connected component of the geometric realization of its order complex is contractible. We then apply this construction to two restricted domains. For fixed-extrema domains, we prove that their order-complex realizations are contractible and define a unanimous, anonymous, and face-monotonic social welfare function using the meet operation. For single-peaked domains, we prove that the corresponding subcomplex of the preference complex has a contractible realization and, in the three-alternative case, construct a unanimous, anonymous, and face-monotonic social welfare function.

Date: 2026-09
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