Resource Allocation with Midterm Review

Yijun Liu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A principal funds an agent's project over two periods, with a midterm review providing a public signal about project quality. The agent privately knows the project's quality and always prefers more funding, while the principal wants to match funding to quality. A natural benchmark uses the review only after it arrives, to update beliefs and improve the second-period allocation. The optimal mechanism instead frontloads the review's information value: it also uses the review as an incentive device to elicit truthful reporting up front, thereby strictly improving the principal's first-period expected payoff. In the optimal mechanism, higher-quality projects receive more funding initially but face larger cuts after a bad review, leaving them with less funding than lower-quality projects. A good review increases funding, but the resulting allocation need not preserve the initial ranking of projects and eventually declines with quality.

Date: 2026-10
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