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Disentangling Liquidity-Constrained from Strategic Default: A Deep Learning Approach

Arka P. Bandyopadhyay

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Abstract: I use a deep neural network (DNN) on a proprietary panel of commercial mortgages spanning 1998--2021 to separate liquidity-constrained default from strategic default -- two competing, observationally similar explanations for delinquency that are difficult to disentangle with standard parametric models. Conditional on delinquency, property income (net operating income, or NOI) is a more important determinant of the default rate than leverage (loan-to-value, or LTV), despite LTV's status as the workhorse variable in the commercial mortgage default literature. I recover borrower motive from otherwise observationally equivalent delinquency states through a joint analysis of default rates across NOI and LTV buckets, and show that the resulting thresholds are stable across the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020--2021 COVID-19 shock to commercial real estate. Because commercial borrowers are firms rather than households, and because responsibility for a missed payment is diffused across an organization rather than borne by a single decision-maker, the moral and reputational frictions that discourage strategic default in the residential setting are attenuated -- making commercial mortgages a setting in which strategic behavior should be comparatively easier to detect, and comparatively costly to ignore for investors, servicers, and regulators.

Date: 2026-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hre and nep-mac
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