Search and Matching without Reciprocity

Nicolas Bonneton and Christopher Sandmann

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study equilibrium sorting in the canonical search-and-matching model with Nash bargaining and ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity. Under standard conditions for assortative matching under search, match surplus retains two properties of Becker's frictionless benchmark---single-crossing and single-peakedness---but necessarily loses the third, reciprocity. Instead, search generates consensus: intervals of types share the same surplus-maximizing partner. For such intervals, mismatched pairs are more likely to match, conditional on meeting, than perfectly assortative ones. Two forces drive this: with search, outside options rise less than one-for-one with productivity and fall more for agents with fewer suitable partners. Globally, upper contour sets of the match-probability surface are lattices below an endogenous threshold but almost never above it. This means that MLRP fails for some log-concave survival function.

Date: 2026-10
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