Mediated Disclosure

Mark Whitmeyer and Kun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce a mediator to a communication setting with verifiable (hard) evidence and characterize precisely when mediation can induce every obedient outcome--every type-contingent distribution of actions that the receiver is willing to follow--including the outcome that delivers the sender's commitment (Bayesian persuasion) payoff. For both type-independent and general preferences, it is necessary for each type to have a message he alone can send. This is also sufficient for type-independent preferences, whereas the general case also requires a particular alignment of the types' utilities. We also rank evidence structures by the distributions of actions conditional on the sender's type that they can induce at (mediated) equilibrium, through garbling conditions analogous to Blackwell's comparison of experiments.

Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.36490 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2610.36490

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().