Politics and Institutional change: The Water Commission Act of 1913

Mark Kanazawa and Mark T. Kanazawa
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Mark Kanazawa: Carleton College
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mark Tooru Kanazawa

No 2025-01, Working Papers from Carleton College, Department of Economics

Abstract: Economists have long argued that increasing resource scarcity can lead to more clearly defined individual property rights, but the precise mechanism whereby this occurs remains unclear to this day. This paper documents the role of politics in shaping the creation of individual property rights within the context of appropriative water law in early 20th century California, finding evidence of both party ideology and interest group influence in establishing a new system for administering appropriative water rights.

JEL-codes: K11 N11 N51 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07
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Working Paper: Politics and institutional change: The Water Commission Act of 1913 (2024)
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