Procedural Justice and the Regulation of Tax Compliance Behaviour: The Moderating Role of Personal Norms

Kristina Murphy ()
Additional contact information
Kristina Murphy: Faculty of Arts, Deakin University

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: The aim of regulatory enforcement is to gain future compliance from offenders. At the same time, enforcement practices should not result in the alienation of those they come into contact with. In an area such as taxation, like in many other regulatory contexts, the behaviour being regulated is continuous and fundamental to the long-term health of the community. In such a regulatory context, the goal should therefore be to secure long-term voluntary compliance. This chapter will present an argument for why deterrence-based enforcement strategies might be counterproductive in meeting these goals. Using survey data collected from a group of 652 tax offenders, it will be suggested that a process-based model of regulation—one which places persuasion and fair treatment in the foreground of a regulatory enforcement encounter—offers much promise in the regulation of taxpayer behaviour.

Keywords: Tax compliamce; personal norms; taxpayer behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2007-12-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0731.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0731

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Benson ().