Empowering Local Government for Development: 'Asymmetric Localism' in India

Utsav Kumar Singh
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Utsav Kumar Singh: International Center for Public Policy, Georgia State University

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: The concept of asymmetric federalism is well established in the literature on decentralization and public finance, but little attention has been paid to what I term 'asymmetric localism.' Such a system exists when some local governments enjoy more robust expenditure and revenue assignments than others of a similar size at the same tier. In this paper, I describe asymmetric localism in the Indian case through a systematic comparison of autonomous councils in Assam with the more common panchayat system elsewhere in the country. The study begins with the assumption that local demands are subject to change across geographies and times. Consequently, this variation requires an accountable local institution to synchronize local interest with national priorities. The concept of local government is rooted in the political philosophy of 'localism': addressing community-specific needs by bringing decision-making closer to the people. Asymmetries are built into the very nature of local government, particularly in multicultural countries such as India, but have received surprisingly scant academic attention. I apply asymmetric localism in this study to critically examine different types of local governance structures in India. Despite structural differences, local governments, at least ostensibly, share the objective of inclusive and sustainable development. However, on many fronts, local governments show differential progress in furthering peopleÕs aspirations. Some institutions are performing better while others are struggling to deliver on the local priorities, consequently delaying the development process. To some extent this limitation in local governance is grounded in local autonomy and intergovernmental relations. Motivated by this problem, the central question that undergirds my proposed research is this: In what way and to what extent do local autonomy and intergovernmental relations contribute towards the better functioning of local governments? I address this argument in light of asymmetric localism by comparing two forms of local governanceÑAutonomous Councils and Panchayati Raj InstitutionsÑin India. Both the institutions are functioning within the same federation with differing levels of financial autonomy and legislative power endowed upon them.

Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2025-10
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