When Bad Things Happen to Good Banks: Contagious Bank Runs and Currency Crises

Raphael Solomon

Staff Working Papers from Bank of Canada

Abstract: The author develops a twin crisis model featuring multiple banks. At each bank, domestic and foreign depositors play a banking game. This game has a run and a no-run equilibrium. Bank failures drain reserves in addition to those drained when foreign agents convert domestic currency to foreign. The fixed exchange rate collapses if a threshold number of banks fail. Agents observe sunspots to aid their equilibrium selection. The numerical solution matches somewhat the Turkish financial sector prior to the crisis of 2001. The Turkish exchange rate appears to have exposed the financial system to a 10 per cent risk of collapse.

Keywords: Exchange rates; Financial institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 F30 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin, nep-ifn, nep-mon and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/wp04-18.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bca:bocawp:04-18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff Working Papers from Bank of Canada 234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G9, Canada. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().