Forming Efficient Networks

David Wettstein () and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 123, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Keywords: shapley value; networks; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Forming efficient networks (2005)
Working Paper: Forming Efficient Networks (2004)
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