Cooperative Production and Efficiency

Carmen Bevia () and Luis Corchon

No 305, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

Date: 2007-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperative production and efficiency (2009)
Working Paper: Cooperative Production and Efficiency (2007)
Working Paper: Cooperative production and efficiency (2007)
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