Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests

Itai Ashlagi and Flip Klijn

No 479, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Date: 2010-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (2012)
Working Paper: Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests (2010)
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