Bank runs without self-fulfilling prophecies

Zhu Haibin

No 106, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: This paper proposes that bank runs are unique equilibrium outcomes instead of self-fulfilling prophecies. By assuming that depositors make their withdrawal decisions sequentially, the model provides an equilibrium-selection mechanism in the economy. A bank run would occur if and only if depositors perceive a low return on bank assets. Furthermore, a panic situation arises only when the market information is imperfect. A two-stage variant of the model shows that banks would deliberately offer a demand-deposit contract that is susceptive to bank runs.

JEL-codes: C7 G14 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2001-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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