CEO turnover risk and firm environmental performance
Giulio Cornelli,
Magdalena Erdem and
Egon Zakrajšek ()
No 1190, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements
Abstract:
We investigate the relationship between the probability of a CEO forced-turnover and firm performance on several environmental dimensions. Our findings suggest that a higher risk of being terminated for the CEO is correlated with a lower environmental ranking, particularly on environmental innovation activities, and more ESG controversies for the firm. The inclusion of ESG-pay clauses in executives' compensation packages only marginally offsets such deterioration. Looking at data on Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, we consistently find that a rise in the probability of being terminated corresponds to an increase in scope 2 and 3 emissions ("carbon leakeage"), whereas scope 1 emissions remain unchanged. Through an instrumental variable approach, we trace the deterioration of firms' ESG controversies- and environmental innovation scores to a strategical re-orientation towards short-terminism.
Keywords: corporate finance; ESG; emissions; environmental innovation; short-terminism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 G30 G34 O31 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-cse, nep-eff, nep-env and nep-sbm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work1190.pdf Full PDF document (application/pdf)
https://www.bis.org/publ/work1190.htm (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bis:biswps:1190
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin Fessler ().