Big techs, credit, and digital money

Markus Brunnermeier and Jonathan Payne

No 1306, BIS Working Papers from Bank for International Settlements

Abstract: This paper examines how digital payment ledgers operated by BigTech platforms and central banks can expand uncollateralized credit. However, policymakers face a trilemma-no system can simultaneously achieve efficient credit enforcement, limit rent extraction, and preserve user privacy. Monopolistic platforms enforce repayment but compromise privacy and extract rents; public or privacy-respecting ledgers protect users but weaken enforcement; platform co-opetition or programmable public ledgers balance enforcement and rents, but only by reducing privacy.

Keywords: ledgers; platform money; CBDC; currency competition; private currencies; industrial organisation of payments; platforms; big tech; trilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E51 G23 L51 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon, nep-pay and nep-reg
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