‘Value Freedom’ and the Scope of Economic Inquiry: II. The Fact/Value Continuum and the Basis for Scientific and Humanistic Policy

Larry Dwyer

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1983, vol. 42, issue 3, 353-368

Abstract: Abstract. Underlying the view of economic methodologists that the economist in his professional capacity is prohibited from making value judgments concerning policy ends is the assumption that there exists an irreducible gap between statements of fact and value judgments, such that value judgments are incapable of receiving support on the basis of scientific inquiry. Once a strict fact/value dualism is seen to be untenable, and once it is recognized that value judgments can be grounded in human needs and interests, the standard “purist” conception of the scope of economic inquiry can be rejected in favor of a “humanist” conception. It is argued that adoption of the wider “humanist” conception of the proper goals of economic inquiry is an important step in the development of an economic science responsive to the basic needs, interests, and aspirations of human beings.

Date: 1983
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