Prudence and Constitutional Rights

Edward F. McClennen

American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2004, vol. 63, issue 1, 213-256

Abstract: ABSTRACT. In The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock argue for institutional safeguards to ensure maximal benefit for all members of a community against the potential tyranny of the majority. I extend this idea by introducing prudential concerns and argue that they ought to be factored into the decision making that constructs such safeguards. Specifically, I see the safeguarding of prudential concerns for all members of society as a matter that should be secured from the random fate of the political process by constitutional provisions.

Date: 2004
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