Labor empowerment in corporate boards: The devil is in the details

Sophie Harnay, Riyad Manseri and Antoine Rebérioux

Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 2025, vol. 64, issue 2, 200-228

Abstract: In 2013, mandatory worker representation on French corporate boards was enacted. We examine the way employee directors have been incorporated within the board machinery. Our empirical results indicate that employee representatives have a limited access to board committees. This result casts doubt on the ability of employee directors to significantly influence corporate governance. Consistent with this analysis, we do not find any significant impact, either positive or negative, of codetermination on firm performance.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12363

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:indres:v:64:y:2025:i:2:p:200-228

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Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society is currently edited by Christopher (Kitt) Carpenter, Steven Raphael and stevenraphael@berkeley.edu

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