Institutional Stimulation of Deliberative Decision‐Making: Division of Labour, Deliberative Legitimacy and Technical Regulation in the European Single Market

Thomas Gehring and Michael Kerler

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2008, vol. 46, issue 5, 1001-1023

Abstract: Institutions stimulate deliberative decision‐making if they hinder stakeholders from introducing bargaining power into the decision process. This article explores the conditions for, and limits of, the creation of deliberative legitimacy in single market regulation. An assessment of the standardization procedure demonstrates that legitimacy arises only from the combination of political and technical deliberation.

Date: 2008
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