Blacklisting and the EU as a Global Regulator: The Institutionally Predisposed Norm Breaker

Johannes Jarlebring

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2023, vol. 61, issue 4, 1007-1025

Abstract: The European Union (EU) is commonly considered to be a regulatory great power that projects external influence based on the power vested in its internal market. Relatively little is known, however, about why and when the EU mobilises its market power to put direct pressure on non‐cooperative countries in regulatory matters. This article examines a critical case of such power projection: the ‘blacklisting’ of third countries. Testing expectations drawn from some of the main theories of EU power, it finds that elite action to promote the rule of law best explains why the EU uses blacklisting, whereas bottom‐up stakeholder pressure explains when this technique is used. A combination of the theories can therefore explain the puzzling pattern of where blacklisting schemes were set up with reference to EU norms and pegged to international law but eventually applied quasi‐exclusively to tiny third countries. These findings call for further research on EU market power.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:61:y:2023:i:4:p:1007-1025

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