Theorising Bounded Rationality in EU Policy‐Making

Filipa Figueira

Journal of Common Market Studies, 2025, vol. 63, issue 4, 1298-1317

Abstract: This article proposes a theoretical framework combining multi‐level governance (MLG) with bounded rationality. MLG theories have become increasingly popular to understand European Union (EU) policy‐making and interactions between national, sub‐national and EU levels. At the same time, principles of bounded rationality are entering the public policy debate, highlighting the role of cognitive biases in policy formation. However, these two developments have been separate, as bounded rationality has been little used in EU studies. The article therefore proposes a framework integrating the two lenses. This sheds new light on the optimal allocation of tasks between EU and national levels, given the prevalence of different cognitive biases at each level. Findings are that EU‐level policy‐making can be hampered by availability heuristics and undefined preferences, whilst national policy‐making is prone to zero‐sum bias and myopia. Insights are applied to research policy as an example, helping to explain obstacles to EU integration in this area.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13704

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:63:y:2025:i:4:p:1298-1317

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0021-9886

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Common Market Studies is currently edited by Jim Rollo and Daniel Wincott

More articles in Journal of Common Market Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().