SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

Georges Dionne (), Pierre-Carl Michaud and Maki Dahchour

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013, vol. 11, issue 4, 897-917

Date: 2013
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Related works:
Working Paper: Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection and Learning in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France (2010)
Working Paper: Separating moral hazard from adverse selection and learning in automobile insurance: Longitudinal evidence from France (2010)
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