CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

Dirk Jenter and Fadi Kanaan

Journal of Finance, 2015, vol. 70, issue 5, 2155-2184

Abstract: type="main">

This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand-collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90-super-th to the 10-super-th percentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.

Date: 2015
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Working Paper: CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation (2015)
Working Paper: CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation (2008)
Working Paper: CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation (2006)
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