Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe*

Alistair Bruce, Trevor Buck and Brian G. M. Main

Journal of Management Studies, 2005, vol. 42, issue 7, 1493-1506

Abstract: abstract We argue that the dominance of principal‐agent theory as an approach to investigating executive pay has led to an overly narrow focus which may be unhelpful when considering cross‐country differences and probably also hinders within‐country analysis. The paper discusses the interlinked nature of three available theoretical lenses, namely principal‐agent, executive power, and stewardship/stakeholder theories. It argues that institutional theory can provide a useful overarching framework within which appropriate variants of these approaches can be deployed to better comprehend developments in executive pay. We illustrate our approach with a discussion of executive pay in the UK and in Germany.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jomstd:v:42:y:2005:i:7:p:1493-1506

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