Poverty, competition, democracy, and ownership: A general equilibrium model with vertical preferences
Amani Kahloul,
Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed and
Hejer Lasram
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Rim Lahmandi-Ayed
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 21, issue 6, 1143-1178
Abstract:
We consider a general equilibrium model where individuals are simultaneously workers, consumers, and shareholders, with two possible market structures: Monopoly and Duopoly, and two extreme ownership structures: egalitarian and concentrated. Considering three standard poverty indicators, the questions are, whether more competition generates more or less poverty for a given ownership structure; and whether a democratic choice between Monopoly and Duopoly leads to the alternative with less poverty. When the ownership is concentrated, we show that Duopoly generates less poverty than Monopoly and the majority votes for the alternative with less poverty. When the ownership is egalitarian, Duopoly may generate more or less poverty and democratic choice alleviates poverty regarding at least one poverty indicator and worsens poverty regarding at least another one, the three poverty indicators never converging. An empirical study on the effect of competition on poverty supports to some extent our theoretical findings.
Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12413
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Working Paper: Poverty, Competition, Democracy and Ownership: a General Equilibrium Model with Vertical Preferences * (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:21:y:2019:i:6:p:1143-1178
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