Notes on excess entry theorem in a Kantian oligopoly

Yasuhiko Nakamura

Manchester School, 2023, vol. 91, issue 5, 506-519

Abstract: This study revisits the excess entry theorem for quantity and price competition with substitutes and complements in a Kantian oligopoly. In such an oligopoly, we demonstrate that the equilibrium market outcomes are the same between the aforementioned two types of competition regimes with substitutes and complements, and in particular, each firm's equilibrium price and consumer surplus do not depend on the number of firms. Therefore, in quantity and price competition with substitutes and complements in a Kantian oligopoly, the excess entry theorem holds that the number of firms is larger under free entry than under the second‐best social optimality. Finally, in the two types of competition with substitutes and complements, we characterize the ranking orders of the number of firms between free entry and the second‐best social optimality in Kantian and Nashian oligopolies.

Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12450

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:manchs:v:91:y:2023:i:5:p:506-519

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1463-6786

Access Statistics for this article

Manchester School is currently edited by Keith Blackburn

More articles in Manchester School from University of Manchester Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().