Is three a crowd? Small group provision of a public good

Simon Vicary

Metroeconomica, 2018, vol. 69, issue 1, 70-85

Abstract: Suppose a group of individuals within a large community trust one another sufficiently to be able to co†ordinate their contributions to a public good. The alternative is to accept a Nash equilibrium. We show that under a wide range of reasonably plausible circumstances a relatively small group size (in many cases just three) suffices for this to be beneficial to group members.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12169

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:metroe:v:69:y:2018:i:1:p:70-85

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0026-1386

Access Statistics for this article

Metroeconomica is currently edited by Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori

More articles in Metroeconomica from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().