When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries

Luciano Fanti and Domenico Buccella

Metroeconomica, 2019, vol. 70, issue 4, 711-722

Abstract: In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e., without unions). If unions are sufficiently wage‐sensitive, it is shown that the presence of sufficiently large network effects makes unionisation the Pareto efficient sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1111/meca.12249

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Working Paper: When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries (2017)
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