Network Externalities, Endogenous Managerial Delegation, and Import Tariffs Policy in a Cournot Third‐Country Model

Di Wu and Leonard F. S. Wang

Metroeconomica, 2026, vol. 77, issue 2, 174-190

Abstract: This paper explores the endogenous managerial delegation choice in a Cournot third‐country model with network externalities. Each exporting firm's owner chooses between a sales delegation and a relative‐performance delegation contract. It is shown that in a Cournot third‐country model with free trade, both owners optimally choose relative performance delegation. In contrast, under discriminatory import tariffs, sales delegation becomes the optimal strategy for both firms.

Date: 2026
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