Improvement of Owner‐Occupied Rental Housing: A Game‐theoretic Study of the Decision to Invest

Michael O'Hare

Real Estate Economics, 1981, vol. 9, issue 1, 54-66

Abstract: Game‐theoretic analysis of an owner's decision about renovating or improving his property indicates that some socially desirable choices are dominated, given the owner's preferences. In the case of owner‐occupied multiple dwellings, public policy should revise the institutions that force the owner to injure society in order to benefit himself and his tenants. Separating assessment from building permit issuance (in the area of tax administration), and revising building codes to permit owners to do their own work under appropriate supervision where licensed contractors are now required (in the area of regulation), would be socially beneficial.

Date: 1981
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