Equilibrium Tariff Schedules in Commercial Policy Games under Uncertainty

Didier Laussel () and Antoine Soubeyran

Review of International Economics, 1993, vol. 1, issue 3, 243-52

Abstract: A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. The governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a "volume of trade shock," the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a "terms of trade shock," constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Date: 1993
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