Regional Cooperation among Microstates

Soamiely Andriamananjara and Maurice Schiff

Review of International Economics, 2001, vol. 9, issue 1, 42-51

Abstract: Owing to their low bargaining power and high negotiation costs, microstates face severe disadvantages when dealing with the outside world. Forming a group with neighboring nations might be an effective instrument to address this problem. This paper presents a model in which the decision to form, expand or join a regional club is based on negotiation costs and bargaining power rather than on the traditional costs and benefits of trade integration. The model is used to determine the optimal and the equilibrium group size under various entry conditions. The welfare implications of the entry conditions are also examined.

Date: 2001
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