Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis*

James Albrecht and Jan van Ours

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 108, issue 3, 361-372

Abstract: This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used. We thus reject the hypothesis that education is not used as a signal in the hiring process.

Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00457.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
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